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PROPERTY
I. ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIVATE RIGHT OF WAY
A. Statutory Eminent Domain
In South Carolina a landowner whose land can be drained
properly only through adjacent land appears to have statutory
authority ' to enter the adjoining land for the purpose of construc-
ting necessary drainage ditches. The appellant corporation in
Clemson University v. First Provident Corp.2 wanted to enlarge
its prescriptive easement, originally established to drain farm
land,3 to support drainage for a residential subdivision.4 The cor-
poration argued the statute did not grant a private right of emi-
nent domain or condemnation.' Instead the statute was said to
establish "a right and concommitant obligation in every land-
owner in the state."' This novel argument by the appellant was
necessary because the court had earlier held7 the statute violated
that provision of the South Carolina Constitution which says
"private property shall not be taken for private use without the
consent of the owner. . . ."I The corporation further argued that,
since private eminent domain was not now an issue, any chal-
lenge to the statute must be premised on a denial of equal protec-
tion or a lack of due process.' The equal protection attack would
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-51 (1962) provides:
Right to open waterway for drainage.-Any person owning lands which
can only be properly drained through or over lands of other persons through or
over which there is no right of way, sufficient waterway or ditch cut may, as
hereinafter provided, enter, construct and cut a waterway or ditch through and
over such lands to the nearest waterway, ditch stream or outlet then existing.
2. 260 S.C. 640, 197 S.E.2d 914 (1973).
3. Id. at 651, 197 S.E.2d at 919.
4. Id. at 647, 197 S.E.2d at 917.
5. Brief for Appellant at 9.
6. Id.
7. Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 126 S.E.2d 360 (1962). In Young two property
owners enjoined a watershed conservation district from taking their land to construct a
community watershed. The court held the attempted taking was for private use and
therefore prohibited by S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17. See also Beaudrot v. Murphy, 53 S.C.
118, 30 S.E. 825 (1897). The court in Beaudrot examined a statute granting a land-locked
private landowner the legal right to construct an access road to the nearest public highway
across neighboring lands. The court held the statute invalid, for it allowed private takings
in violation of the constitutional prohibition of art. 1, § 17.
8. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
9. Brief for Appellant at 9, Clemson Univ. v. First Provident Corp., 269 S.C. 640, 197
S.E.2d 914 (1973).
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fail, they alleged, because all property owners are benefited and
burdened equally. 0 Moreover, provisions of the statute which
provide for proper notice and procedures for implementing the
statutory right of way rebut any due process argument." The
court, however, unpersuaded by appellants' reasoning, held the
attempted expansion of the prescriptive easement was for private
use and therefore unconstitutional.'" To support this proposition
the court cited Young v Wiggins.'3 In Young, the plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the directors of a local watershed district from condemn-
ing their land in order to establish a resevoir. 4 The plaintiffs
alleged that impounding water for the agricultural benefit of the
other abutting landowners was not for "public use," as required
by the state constitution in eminent domain proceedings.' 5 In the
sense that the abutting landowners seeking the reservoir were
members of the public, there would have been public benefit. The
public in general, however, would not have been able to use the
proposed resevoir.'6 The court narrowly interpreted "public use"
to mean use by the public rather than merely of "public bene-
fit."'" Thus, the court held the flooding of the plaintiffs' property,
under the guise of eminent domain, would have been for private
use and, therefore, was unconstitutional.
The court correctly implied by its cite to Young that the
subdivision owners' position in Clemson was analogous to that of
the property owners seeking establishment of the reservoir in
Young. In both cases, private parties attempted to take private
land for private use. Had the court in Clemson found the drainage
easement, sought by the appellant corporation, to represent a
public use there would have been a serious undermining of the
concept of private property. Such an expansive interpretation of
public use would permit a developer to build in any low area with
the assurance that the court would. enforce a drainage easement
across adjoining private property.
10. Id.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 18-52 to 58 (1962).
12. 260 S.C. at 649, 197 S.E.2d at 918.
13. 240 S.C. 426, 126 S.E.2d 360 (1962).
14. Young v. Wiggins, 240 S.C. 426, 428, 126 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1962).
15. Id. at 432, 126 S.E.2d at 363.
16. Id. at 433, 126 S.E.2d at 364.
17. Id. at 432-33, 126 S.E.2d at 363-64. See 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 31 (1965)
and 26 Am. Jun. 2d Eminent Domain §§ 27-38 (1968) for general discussions on what
constitutes public use.
[V-)l. 26
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B. Easement by Implication and Right of Way by Necessity
The appellant corporation in Clemson also argued that its
prescriptive easement should be enlarged on the theory of ease-
ment by implication and easement by necessity.18 The distinction
between an easement by implication and one of necessity was not
given by the court but an excellent discussion on implied ease-
ments can be found in Crosland v. Rogers.9 In Crosland, the court
said that to establish an implied easement there must have been
unity of title of the dominant and servient estates at some point
in time and a division of the single estate. Furthermore, the ease-
ment must have been apparent, continuous, and necessary at the
time of the division of the estate. "[T]he term necessary mean-
ing there could be no other way to enjoy the dominant tenement
without this easement.
' 20
Creation of an easement by necessity is fully discussed in
Brasington v. Williams. 2' The elements stated in Brasington are
unity of title, severance of title, and necessity.3 In defining ne-
cessity2 one of the cases cited was Crosland. Therefore, necessity
would seem to mean the same thing in both an easement byimpli-
cation and an easement by necessity. The only distinction be-
tween these two types of easements is that the easement by impli-
cation must be apparent and continuous at the time of severance
of title. Both easements are based on the notion of an implied
grant,24 which will be implied only if the easement is necessary
for the enjoyment of the dominant estate. The necessity require-
ment can only be determined at the time of separation from the
servient estate.2 5 In Clemson testimony showed the estates in
question were once part of a single farm,26 satisfying the require-
ments of unity and severance of title. The new residential subdi-
vision on the dominant estate represented a change in circum-
stances that precipitated the current necessity to increase the
18. Clemson Univ. v. First Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 651-52, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919
(1973).
19. 32 S.C. 130, 10 S.E. 874 (1889).
20. Id. at 133, 10 S.E. at 875.
21. 143 S.C. 233, 141 S.E. 375 (1927).
22. Id. at 245-46, 141 S.E. at 382-83.
23. Id. at 247, 141 S.E. at 383.
24. Clemson Univ. v. First Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 652, 197 S.E.2d 914, 919
(1973), citing Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 233, 141 S.E. 375 (1927).
25. 260 S.C. at 652, 197 S.E.2d at 920, quoting Merrimon v. McCain, 201 S.C. 76,
84, 21 S.E.2d 404, 408 (1942).
26. 260 S.C. at 652, 197 S.E.2d at 920.
1974]
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prescriptive drainage easement. 27 Since the necessity was subse-
quent to the division of the dominant and servient estates, the
court ruled no claim of an easement by implication or necessity
could be maintained.
2 8
C. Owner Abandonment
After platting a subdivision, including streets, the developer
in City of Myrtle Beach v. Parker,21 sold lots to the public. In the
early 1940s as a result of an accidental burning of a bridge span-
ning a swash area, one of these streets, Spivey Beach Road,
ceased to be used for vehicular traffic. The general public, how-
ever, continued to use the street to walk to and from the beach.
Construction to the north of the destroyed bridge blocked the tide
thus creating a dead swash and obviating the need for a bridge.3
The respondent then leased the surrounding property and suc-
ceeded in getting the entire area, including the dead swash, re-
zoned by the city to accommodate an amusement park. After
construction of the amusement park in the rezoned area, includ-
ing that portion of the dead swash where the old bridge had been,
the city notified the respondent that he had to vacate the city's
right of way.3
In the circuit court the respondent successfully argued that
the city had abandoned its rights in the road "as a road" in the
amusement park area.32 On appeal the supreme court distin-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 260 S.C. 475, 197 S.E.2d 290 (1973).
30. Epps v. Freeman, 200 S.E.2d 235, 238-39 (S.C. 1973). The facts in Parker do not
indicate how the disputed area became a dead swash, but in Epps the facts concern the
same swash area and indicate the construction created the dead swash.
31. City of Myrtle Beach v. Parker, 260 S.C. 475, 481, 197 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1973).
32. Id. at 483-84, 197 S.E.2d at 294. The court said:
Both the master and the circuit judge relied upon the following seven facts
as showing an unequivocal intention on the part of the city to abandon that
portion of Spivey Beach Road which traverses the swash or park area, to wit:
(1) The absence of the bridge over [the swash] for about 25 years . . . . (2)
Failure of the city to maintain the bridge and the portion of the road passing
through the amusement park area. (3) The appropriation in 1949 of money to
remove a portion of the remains of the bridge. (4) The erection by the city of
[a sewer] in the right of way . . . . (5) The action of the city in changing the
zoning to permit the construction of the park. . and referring to the [disputed
right of way] in the official minutes of the meeting "as seemingly abandoned."
(6) The acceptance of a zoning map. . . showing the [disputed road] "stubbed
off." (7) The failure of the city to attempt to enforce its rights from the construc-
tion of the park in 1966 until August 1970. Id.
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss2/11
PROPERTY
guished between a public and private easenint, apparently be-
cause no distinction was made in the lower court. 3 This dis-
tinction was necessary because just as public and private ease-
ments arise differently, they are extinguished differently.34 Public
rights in the dedicated streets could not have arisen until there
had been an expressed or implied acceptance, as evidenced by
formal public acceptance or general public use.3 Thus the public
easement would have arisen no later than the time the road was
first used for vehicular traffic, around 1937.36 The court noted the
general rule that once a public right of way is established non-
use alone will not constitute legal abandonment. 3
In addition to the above common law safeguard, the court
also discussed statutory provisions which were applicable. 8 The
legal power to abandon public streets was vested in the city coun-
cil and could be exercised only after the council had made an
official determination that the street was no longer needed.39 The
statutory procedure also required that public notice be given of
the intention to abandon the road 0 and that a court determine
whether the action was in the best interest of the municipality.4'
The supreme court held the facts indicated the city had not aban-
doned the road because it had not complied with the statutory
requirements necessary to constitute legal abandonment.
2
Reluctant to forego the abandonment argument, the re-
spondent asserted that a city may accept only the desired seg-
ment of a dedicated easement and that likewise a segment of such
an easement may be abandoned without abandoning the ease-
ment in its entirety.43 The respondent argued the city had aban-
doned the portion of the easement formerly used for vehicular
33. Id. at 485, 197 S.E.2d at 295. Although the city might have had property rights
in the disputed road by virtue of its purchase of two abutting lots, the court found no need
to explore this as a further rationale for its holding.
34. Id. at 485-86, 197 S.E.2d at 295.
35. Outlaw v. Moise, 222 S.C. 24, 31, 71 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1952).
36. 260 S.C. at 479, 197 S.E.2d at 292 (1973).
37. Id. at 487, 197 S.E.2d at 296, citing Chafee v. City of Aiken, 57 S.C. 507, 35 S.E.
800 (1900).
38. 260 S.C. at 487, 197 S.E.2d at 296, citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1327 (1962); see
also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-521-22 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
39. 260 S.C. at 487, 197 S.E.2d at 296, citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1327 (1962).
40. 260 S.C. at 487, 197 S.E.2d at 296, citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-521 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
41. Id.
42. 260 S.C. at 487, 197 S.E.2d at 296.
43. Id. at 487-88, 197 S.E.2d at 296.
1974]
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traffic, while retaining the segment used for sewer and storm
drains under the road." The court dismissed this argument be-
cause neither the respondent nor the court knew of any authority
to support it." Actually this argument had been negated by the
previous arguments relating to public easements. The fact that
only a portion of the easement was abandoned would not narrow
the issue to a point where the court could sidestep the overwhelm-
ing common law and statutory authority opposed to casual aban-
donment of a public right of way.
D. Estoppel
The supreme court, in Parker also rejected the argument that
the city was estopped from asserting its rights in the public ease-
ment. Assuming only a private right were involved, the court
pointed out that the necessary elements for an affirmative plea
of estoppel were not present. 6 Respondent and his attorney ad-
mitted in testimony they knew that city sewer pipes were located
in the disputed right of way.4" The court intimated that since the
respondents knew the city was using the right of way they could
not be misled into thinking the city had abandoned any claim to
the property. When one attempts to invoke the doctrine of estop-
pel against a municipality with respect to streets dedicated to the
public, the considerations are different than those applied against
private parties.4" The court said no private rights in a public
street can be acquired by adverse possession alone.49 But where
44. Id. at 488, 197 S.E.2d at 297.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 488, 197 S.E.2d at 297. The elements, although not given by the court, are
listed in 12 S. WILLISToN, CoNTrAcTs § 1508 n.1 (3d ed. 1970) where the writer quotes
Williams v. Jones, 324 P.2d 541, 543 (Okla. 1958), which in turn quotes Fite v. Von
Antwerp, 201 Okla. 26, 28, 200 P.2d 439, 441 (1948):
The essential elements of an "equitable estoppel' are: First, there must be
a false representation or concealment of facts; second, it must have been made
with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts; third, the party to
whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of know-
ledge, of the real facts; fourth, it must have been made with the intention that
it should be acted upon; fifth, the party to whom it was made must have relied
on, or acted upon, it to his prejudice.
This description ultimately derives, with some minor alterations from M. BIGELOW,
ESTOPPEL 570 (5th ed. 1890).
47. City of Myrtle Beach v. Parker, 260 S.C. 475, 488, 197 S.E.2d 290, 297 (1973).
48. Id. at 489, 197 S.E.2d at 297. By an analogy to Crocker v. Collins, 37 S.C. 327,
155 S.E. 951 (1892), the court explained the different considerations. In Crocker the
plaintiff attempted to obtain part of a municipal alley by adverse possession.
49. Id. at 488, 197 S.E.2d at 297, citing Crocker v. Collins, 37 S.C. 327, 15 S.E. 951
(1892).
[Vol. 26
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there has been adverse possession for the statutory period plus
other circumstances that would make it inequitable not to favor
the assertion of private rights over the public rights, then the
court may invoke the principle of estoppel to protect the private
party." The court in Parker was saying the law is the same
whether the private party claims a public right of way on the
theory of estoppel or adverse possession; both theories must be
proved to be successful. In Parker the court found neither suffi-
cient injustice to the respondents to support a plea of estoppel nor
adverse possession for the prescriptive period.51
The court considered still another type of easement in Epps
v. Freeman.2 It held the grantees had "special property interests"
in an open area abutting their lots because the open area was an
integral part of the original subdivision plan. The grantor had
sold the lots at Myrtle Beach with reference to a plat which repre-
sented them as ocean front, but a vacant area approximately one
hundred eighty-five feet in width existed between the eastern end
of the lots and the seaward subdivision line.53 The grantor's heirs
brought an action to remove any cloud on their claim of title to
the open area. The court inferred from the facts that there was
no intention by the grantor to include the disputed area as part
of the grantees' lots. Instead, the court reasoned, the grantor
meant to enhance the value of the property by leaving the area
open, thus creating ocean front lots. The court analogized the
open area to a park in a platted subdivision.5 It noted that when
lots in a platted subdivision which includes a park or an open
area are sold, an easement is generally implied in favor of the
property owners. 6 This easement is not to be confused with an
easement by implication which only arises from necessity.57 The
similarity of language is unfortunate; however, in Carson v.
Gibson,5" a case cited by the court in Epps, the court character-
ized this property interest as
50. Id. at 489, 197 S.E.2d at 297, quoting Grady v. City of Greeville, 129 S.C. 89, 100,
123 S.E. 494, 498 (1924), which quotes with approval Crocker v. Collins, 37 S.C. 327, 332-
33, 15 S.E. 951, 953 (1892).
51. Id. at 489, 197 S.E.2d at 298.
52. 200 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1973).
53. Id. at 236.
54. Id. at 242.
55. Id.
56. Id., quoting Carson v. Gibson, 217 S.C. 500, 509, 61 S.E.2d 58, 62 (1950).
57. Crosland v. Rogers, 32 S.C. 130, 133, 10 S.E. 874, 875 (1890). See generally
Brasington v. Williams, 143 S.C. 223, 141 S.E.2d 375 (1927).
58. 217 S.C. 500, 61 S.E.2d 58 (1950).
1974]
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[flowing] from the deed and plat of the former owner to [the
purchaser] and, as is uniformly held, equity and good consci-
ence requires its vindication and protection. Many courts base
the right of the grantee or his assigns ...upon the theory of
implied grant or covenant; more, probably, upon the ground of
equitable estoppel and some upon a combination of these con-
cepts."
The court in Epps made no attempt to clarify the issue. It held
that the lot owners had acquired "a special property interest" in
the vacant area and whether it was created "by implied grant,
estoppel, or otherwise" the plaintiff was barred "from the relief
sought by the complaint.""
I. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
In Coleman v. Daniel1 the respondent transferred his farm
to his daughter and son-in-law shortly before imminent foreclo-
sure. 2 The alleged consideration for the farm was cancellation of
a prior debt, assumption of an existing mortgage on the farm and
an agreement to support the grantor, who was to retain possession
of the farm.A3 The total consideration valued most favorably to
the respondents was approximately one half the fair market value
of the farm.64 The plaintiff brought this action to set aside the
deed as being a fraud on him as a creditor.65
The South Carolina statute6 on fraudulent conveyances has
been interpreted to require that two types of conveyances be set
aside. They are:
First, where the transfer is made by the grantor with the
actual intent of defrauding his creditors [and] the intent is
imputed to the grantee, . . . and, second, where a transfer is
made without actual intent to defraud the grantor's creditors,
but without consideration. 7
59. Id. at 507, 61 S.E.2d at 61.
60. 200 S.E.2d at 242.
61. 199 S.E.2d 74 (S.C. 1973).
62. Id. at 76.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 77. Note that the supreme court made its own finding of facts in a case of
equity.
65. Id. at 75.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-301 (1962).
67. Coleman v. Daniel, 199 S.E.2d 74, 79 (S.C. 1973), quoting Jeffords v. Berry, 247
S.C. 347, 351, 147 S.E.2d 415, 417-18 (1966), which in turn quotes Gardner v. Krven, 184
S.C. 37, 40, 191 S.E. 814, 816 (1937). Gardner cited Farmers Bank v. Bradham, 129 S.C.
270, 123 S.E. 835 (1924) and McInnis v. McRae, 134 S.C. 162, 132 S.E. 473 (1926).
[Vol. 26
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The court said some circumstances are so frequently present in
fraudulent conveyances that they are said to be "badges of
fraud."68 Some of the more frequent badges of fraud are:
(1) the indebtedness of the grantor; (2) insufficient considera-
tion; (3) special relationship between grantor and grantee; (4)
departure from usual method of business; ...(7) transfer of
debtors entire estate; (8) reservation of a benefit in transfer; (9)
retention by debtor of possession of the property."
The court found practically all of these indicia of fraud present
in the conveyance at issue." Apparently this was conclusive as to
the grantor's fraudulent intent because the court then imputed
this intent to the grantees," thus voiding the conveyance. The
court said that the closeness of the family situation and the pres-
ence of the "badges of fraud" demanded an inquiry by the gran-
tees and they failed to adequately explain why a detailed inquiry
was not made 72
II. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
In Abbott v. Arthur7 3 the owner of a restricted lot on the
perimeter of a residential subdivision attempted to construct a
commercial building thereon. 4 The issue was whether advancing
encroachment of commercial structures75 and minor covenant vio-
lations by three property owners" had so changed the residential
nature of the subdivision that the purposes of the restrictions
were defeated." The court concluded that neither the advancing
commercial structures78 nor "the petty business carried on by
three residents" of the subdivision had any substantial effect79 on
68. 199 S.E.2d at 79.
69. Id. quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 10 (1968).
70. 199 S.E.2d 74, 80 (S.C. 1973).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 261 S.C. 31, 198 S.E.2d 261 (1973). The supreme court republished the opinion
of the Honorable George T. Gregory, Presiding Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for
Spartanburg County.
74. Id. at 33, 198 S.E.2d at 262.
75. Brief for Appellant at 3.
76. Id. at 8-10. One resident apparently had no occupation other than that of a
produce business operated out of his basement. Another resident had thousands of azaleas
growing in cans waiting to be sold. A third resident also raised thousands of azaleas.
77. 261 S.C. at 38, 198 S.E.2d at 264.
78. Id. at 42, 198 S.E.2d at 266, citing Pitts v. Brown, 215 S.C. 112, 54 S.E.2d 538
(1949).
79. 261 S.C. 31, 40, 198 S.E.2d 261, 265 (1973).
1974]
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the residential character of the neighborhood. Focusing on en-
croaching commercial development, the court said that in any
restricted area there must be a boundary line beyond which there
will be unrestricted development." If the restrictions are removed
on one lot it will only be a matter of time until the character of
the entire development would be changed.' No black letter rule
can be laid down to determine when changed conditions will be
held to have defeated the purpose and intent of a restrictive
covenant. However, "it can be safely asserted the changes must
be so radical as practically to destroy the essential objects and
purposes of the agreement.
8
1
2
IV. ZONING
The question presented in Staats v. Snowdene3 is the only
instance of a new interpretation of property law for the survey
period. In Staats, the supreme court interpreted a zoning ordi-
nance of the city of Charleston that provides schools may not be
expanded within a residentially zoned area unless an exception
to the zoning scheme is approved by the Board of Adjustment. 4
Prior to making an exception the Board must determine that
excessive traffic will not be generated on a residential street. If,
however, a school wishes to build or expand in an area zoned light
industrial there is no municipal requirement other than obtaining
a building permit.86 The issue on appeal was whether a school
within the bounds of a residentially zoned "area must apply to
the Board of Adjustment to build a gymnasium several" blocks
from the school in an area zoned light industrial. 7 The parties
stipulated there were no questions of fact, the only issue being the
interpretation of the ordinance.8 The circuit court determined
the ordinance was only aimed at controlling the expansion of
schools where both the expansion and the school were physically
80. Id. at 39, 198 S.E.2d at 264-65, quoting Flinkingshelt v. Johnson, 258 S.C. 77, 87,
187 S.E.2d 233, 238 (1972).
81. 261 S.C. 31, 42, 198 S.E.2d 261, 266 (1973), quoting Pitts v. Brown, 215 S.C. 122,
132, 54 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1949).
82. Pitts v. Brown, 215 S.C. 122, 133, 54 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1949), quoting Rombauer
v. Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 17-18, 40 S.W.2d 545, 553 (1931).
83. 260 S.C. 387, 196 S.E.2d 125 (1973).
84. Id. at 389, 196 S.E.2d at 125.
85. Id.
86. Brief for Respondent at 3-4.
87. Record at 2.
88. 260 S.C. at 389, 196 S.E.2d at 126.
[Vol. 26
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within a residentially zoned district 89 The supreme court re-
versed, citing appellant's brief which "ably states the case for
reversal . . . ""and said:
1. The school is in a protected residential area.
2. The addition of a gymnasium is an expansion of the school.
3. The ordinance forbids expansion without the required deter-
minations by the Board of Adjustment.
4. These determinations have not been made.9'
The school is currently leasing gymnasium facilities some
distance from the school.92 If the Board of Adjustment refuses to
make an exception to the zoning ordinance, as the court indicated
is necessary, they no doubt also have the authority to prevent the
school from leasing the present gymnasium facilities. This would
be true because the court bottomed its decision on the intent
behind the zoning ordinance rather than on a literal interpreta-
tion .3 This intent was to prevent excessive traffic in the residen-
tial area. Commuting to leased premises would create just as
much traffic as commuting to the proposed expansion.
The court did not say what the outcome would be if the
school had attempted to build or lease its gymnasium facilities
outside the municipal limits and therefore beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the Board of Adjustment. It would seem, however, the
holding here could be applied to such a situation. The new traffic
would be within the residential area and thus within the jurisdic-
tion of the Board of Adjustment.
BRUCE T. BENTON
89. Id.
90. Id. at 390, 196 S.E.2d at 126.
91. Id.
92. Record at 7.
93. 260 S.C. at 390, 196 S.E.2d at 126.
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